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CHAPTER 3
THE GEOPOLITICS OF STRATEGIC STABILITY:
LOOKING BEYOND COLD WARRIORS
AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS
C. Dale Walton
Colin S. Gray
“Strategic stability” is a much-used, but under-analyzed, term. Before launching into any discussion of
strategic stability in this century, it is necessary first to
ask what we actually mean by strategic stability. Game
theorists endeavor to define the phrase in very precise
mathematical terms, but even among these specialists
there is no settled agreement on its proper definition.1
In policy debates, meanwhile, the term is used very
loosely to describe anything from rough parity in the
sizes of nuclear arsenals to the perceived unlikelihood
of an acute political crisis.
The argument herein will hinge on the distinction
between what will be called “weapons-oriented” and
“holistic” conceptions of strategic stability. The former
is flawed because of its narrowness, but the latter may
play a useful role in policy debate. While the material
military balance may be an important—sometimes
even the most important—factor in keeping the peace
between two particular states, context is sovereign. It is
only when one considers weaponry in its broader political context that one can assess its role in maintaining stability accurately.
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WEAPONS AND STRATEGIC STABILITY
Weapons-oriented analyses of strategic stability
focus on how fluctuations in the balance of military
power may impact the likelihood of war. In particular,
issues such as the increase or decrease in the number
of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, the
potential vulnerability of nuclear forces, appropriate
basing modes and doctrine, and the deployment (or
nondeployment) and character of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems, have tended to be at the center
of debate. This was particularly characteristic of the
Cold War era, when most of the strategic literature
concentrated obsessively on U.S.-Soviet competition
in the nuclear realm.2 Given the Cold War political
context, one of the authors of this chapter noted over
30 years ago that “discussion of stability and its possible requirements is, in fact, a discussion of deterrence
theory, which in reality is a debate about the operational merits of different postures and doctrines. No
useful, objective, doctrine-neutral exploration of the
idea of stability is possible.”3 The U.S. debate over stability—regardless of whether “arms-race,” “crisis,” or
“strategic” was the chosen modifying adjective—was,
at its core, an argument about how to “do” nuclear
deterrence successfully.
The then-prevailing focus on nuclear armament
was understandable, but overly restricted. To be sure,
both superpowers focused acutely on the quality
and quantity of their arsenals. However, it should be
remembered that the Soviet-American relationship
never was defined by nuclear weapons—the latter
were merely tools that each superpower, profoundly
mistrustful of its peer, accumulated in great quantity.
The deeper reasons for the mistrust were ideological,
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historical, and geopolitical in character: nuclear weapons did not cause the Cold War any more than tanks
and aircraft carriers caused World War II. Each of the
superpowers simply put together what it considered a
sensible military toolkit for the deterrence, and if necessary fighting, of a world war. Given the destructive
power of nuclear weapons, it was entirely understandable that they would stand out from supposedly “normal” conventional weapons. However, the concept of
deterrence itself was not new—to modify and adapt
Clausewitz, nuclear weapons changed the grammar
of deterrence, not its character.4
Discussions of arsenal survivability, equality/
parity of arsenals, and strategic stability were inherently entangled during the Cold War. However, as
the struggle unfolded there was a subtle shift in how
the United States discussed strategic stability. After
the brief period of U.S. nuclear monopoly ended and
as it became increasingly clear that the Soviet Union
was intent on producing a sizable nuclear arsenal of
its own, particular emphasis was placed on arsenal
survivability, with the possibility of a Soviet surprise
attack being a paramount concern.5 However, as time
passed, the U.S. arsenal became both larger and more
technologically sophisticated (including, notably, ongoing improvements in command, control, and communications systems and in the accuracy of submarine-launched ballistic missiles), and concern that the
United States would be unable to respond effectively
to a first strike receded. At the same time, the increasing size and sophistication of the Soviet arsenal made
it ever-clearer to Washington that a nuclear first strike
on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)
would be risky in the most extreme sense of the word.
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The dynamic that dampened fears about survivability—the increase in the size and sophistication of
nuclear arsenals—also had the effect of heightening
concern that the purported nuclear arms race itself
lessened strategic stability,6 undermining efforts to
build trust between the superpowers and encouraging a confrontational mindset on the part of U.S. and
Soviet leaders. Interest in bilateral arms control increased: if uncontrolled nuclear competition seemed
to be dangerous, it seemed to follow logically that
limitations on the number and quality of nuclear arms
would enhance strategic stability.
When the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)
negotiations opened in 1969, the United States still
maintained a clear advantage in the number of warheads deliverable at intercontinental range; Moscow,
however, clearly was not willing to accept ongoing
perceived inferiority in nuclear armaments. In this regard, the political-strategic logic of the process SALT
negotiations was quite different from, say, the multilateral naval arms control process of the 1920s. The
surrender of existing superiority might appear to make
bilateral negotiations unattractive from an American
perspective, and some hawkish policymakers resisted
the realization of the SALT process. However, arms
control proponents could argue, not unreasonably,
that Moscow had a massive ongoing missile-building
program and that, unless Washington either negotiated arms limits or greatly increased its own spending
in this area, a Soviet Union, unencumbered by treaty,
eventually might overtake the United States and establish nuclear superiority. Moreover, equality could
be framed as an essential component of stability: if,
despite efforts to build U.S.-Soviet trust through negotiation, a major crisis did occur, rough parity in over-
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all nuclear capabilities might encourage restraint on
both sides, as neither party would enjoy a significant
advantage. This would underline the apparent inescapability of mutual assured destruction (MAD), and
thus discourage the outbreak of war.
The association of nuclear equality with stability
in the U.S.-Russian relationship did not dissolve with
the end of the Cold War. Indeed, two Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaties (START I and II) were signed in
the early 1990s, and both were predicated on the assumption that the United States and Russia would
endeavor to maintain approximate parity in their
strategic arsenals. In the 2000s, the George W. Bush
administration came into office intending to sever
the “numerical equality-strategic stability” link, but
it soon signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions
Treaty (SORT)—and, overall , SORT was not radically
dissimilar from earlier nuclear arms control treaties.7
In the Barack Obama years, the previous administration’s modest deviation from arms control orthodoxy
essentially was abandoned, as demonstrated by the
text of the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(New START).8
When considering the development U.S.-Soviet/
Russian arms control over the years from circa 1969 to
the present, its most striking quality is its continuity.
This is despite the fact that in the middle portion of
this history, the fundamental character of the Washington-Moscow relationship changed as the Soviet
empire in East-Central Europe, and then the USSR itself, collapsed. What had previously been an ideologically-driven competition between (at least seeming)
peers had transformed into something entirely different. The cutthroat competition for global mastery had
ended definitively.
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These epic events allowed for an ironic reversal in
the logic of Cold War arms control: now that American and Russian leaders both considered a central
nuclear war very unlikely, agreement on truly drastic cuts in arsenals became possible. Rather than arms
control shoring up a seemingly fragile peace, a peace
that was seemed robust enabled more arms control.
This underscores the limitations inherent in a militarily-focused,and, in the Cold War case, even more
narrowly strategic nuclear-focused, vision of strategic
stability. In some circumstances, the military balance
may be a critical factor in specific decisions regarding
war and peace, a theme explored below in greater detail. However, strategic stability is not only, or usually
even primarily, a function of potential foes balancing
the military component of national power. Rather,
strategic stability reflects the overall condition of the
international system—and it can be very difficult to judge
systemic stability accurately. In 1988, the overwhelming
majority of observers did not anticipate massive political instability in East-Central Europe in the following
year; however, in autumn 1989 the fact that the strategic environment was profoundly unstable was obvious, given that momentous political changes were
ongoing and the Soviet reaction to those changes was
not safely predictable. Yet, of course, the U.S.-Soviet
nuclear balance had not changed to any significant degree between 1988 and 1989.
This does not mean that decisions about the size
and composition of nuclear arsenals, and the doctrine
for nuclear use, inherently are trivial. Indeed, in certain political circumstances, the lives of tens, even
hundreds, of millions may be placed at great risk if
nuclear strategy is designed poorly. The Cold War era
U.S. policymaking establishment’s careful attention to
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issues about nuclear weapons was entirely warranted,
regardless of whether the prevailing judgment of the
efficacy of bilateral arms control as an instrument for
the maintenance of peace was flawed. However, in
shaping the future discussion of strategic stability, one
should keep in mind the deficiencies in a weaponsoriented vision of strategic stability. It is possible for
the international system to be reasonably stable even
when the military power of the leading polities is not
particularly well-balanced; conversely, it is possible
for the international system to be deeply unstable
even when great powers (or alliances of great powers)
appear closely matched militarily. The factors that determine whether war or peace will prevail are myriad,
and an undue focus on weaponry sometimes may distract attention from more critical considerations.
In the 2 decades between 1969 and 1989, precise
calculation of the minutia of nuclear arms control was
the focus of obsessive attention. In retrospect, though,
it appears unlikely that the throw-weight of SS-19
missiles or even the number of Ohio-class submarines
deployed determined whether a Third World War
occurred. Instead, whether peace prevailed probably
was more an issue of the personality and values of individual leaders (most critically, Mikhail Gorbachev),9
caution and generally sound judgment on the part of
the George H. W. Bush administration, and simple
good fortune. That combination worked well enough,
but it is disconcerting to consider how, in contrast to
massive effort devoted to arms control, relatively little
intellectual energy occurred before 1989 to considering how best to ensure that the Soviet Union would
not lash out militarily if its satellite empire began to
collapse. Hopefully, in the years preceding the next
great crisis in the international system, the United
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States will have a clearer vision of likely forthcoming
events, and already have developed a sophisticated,
well-considered strategy for how to cope with them;
after all, good luck is an occasional occurrence, not the
foundation stone of grand strategy.
The United States is in need of a holistic conception
of strategic stability in which calculations of relative
military power are only one component in the overall
strategic picture, and not necessarily the most important one. Military power is only one of the many factors that comprise a state’s overall power, but which of
those factors are key to strategic stability will vary according to political circumstances. Furthermore, when
considering calculations of stability in the future, it is
vital that we consider the strategic complications that
accompany multipolarity.
A HOLISTIC VIEW OF STRATEGIC STABILITY
AND INSTABILITY
If a narrow focus on military power does not provide a satisfactory lens for addressing strategic stability, and constricted attention to nuclear arsenals in
particular is excessively narrow, one is left with two
general possibilities. The first is that strategic stability
is so fundamentally flawed an idea that it should be
discarded altogether. Given the difficulty in defining
and assessing stability, it is tempting to do so. However, this chapter argues for a second possibility: that
strategic stability is a concept that can be rescued,
if it is used with an awareness of its problems and
limitations.
Indeed, whatever its flaws, strategic stability is a
necessary phrase insofar as it expresses something that
is vital to the study of strategy: the notion that rela-
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tionships among particular states vary over time, and
there may be points in their relationship when war is a
very real prospect. Moreover, there are periods when
the international system as a whole is highly unstable.
At such times great power war is unusually likely,
particularly if the system is a dynamic multipolar one
in which powers cannot feel secure in their position.
Strategic instability is a genuine circumstance, but a relative one—there is, in practice, never a perfect strategic
equilibrium, just as there is never perfect economic,
environmental, or social stability. True strategic stability is a Platonic ideal, useful as a yardstick for judging
real world conditions, but inherently unattainable as
a policy goal. One can, however, seek to create a more
stable bilateral relationship with a given country, or
even a more stable overall international security environment, than the one that exists at present.
Rescuing strategic stability requires that we broaden the concept to reflect the myriad factors that impact
political stability. There most assuredly have been
historical periods in which relationships between
polities have been particularly unstable, and this has
implications for the likelihood of war. The conditions
that might contribute to such instability are myriad—
social, economic, technological and other factors can create
the conditions for international instability, either brief or
prolonged. If they are to reflect complex political reality, discussions of strategic stability must include such
considerations.
The Europe of the early 16th century illustrates
this point in a striking manner. The application of a
mixture of seafaring technologies had allowed Columbus’ voyages to the New World and Spain’s establishment of colonies that offered a continuing income
to the Spanish Crown, and, somewhat later, the ex-
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propriation of the awesome wealth of the Aztec and
Incan Empires. In 1517, 2 years before the conquest
of the Aztec Empire commenced, a theretofore minor
German theologian composed, in Latin, a document
challenging the sale of indulgences. The printing press
already was widespread in Western and Central Europe by this point, and the subsequent translation
of the Ninety-Five Theses on the Power and Efficacy of
Indulgences into German permitted what began as a
theological controversy among clergy to become the
catalyst for a mass movement.10 This, of course, generally is treated as the beginning of what was to become
known as the Protestant Reformation. Slightly over a
decade later, both dynastic considerations (the desire
to divorce an aging Queen Catherine, so as to permit
marriage to a woman who might bear him a male heir)
and, apparently, straightforward infatuation with the
fetching Anne Boleyn, convinced Henry VIII—the
one-time author of a book criticizing Martin Luther
and Protestantism—to begin the process of separation
from Rome.11
These factors, along with others too numerous to
mention, created the conditions necessary for over
a century of politico-religious warfare in which the
House of Habsburg, particularly its Spanish line (the
House effectively split into two branches in 1521),
would bid unsuccessfully for European hegemony—
an endeavor which France vehemently resisted;12
France would suffer intermittent, sometimes crippling, religious civil war;13 the Dutch Republic would
both fight for independence from Habsburg control
and establish itself as a leading economic power;14 and
the Thirty Years’ War would devastate Central Europe, leaving much of Germany in ruin and millions
dead.15 The 1648 Peace of Westphalia represented a
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more-or-less successful effort by an exhausted Europe
to establish strategic stability and bring an end to a
cycle of violence that was enormously costly to all the
powers involved.
No single variable caused the 16th and early 17th
centuries to unfold as they did; many factors converged to cause cataclysmic upheaval. Coincidence
played a role, as it often does in history: Catholic
Spain happened to begin receiving a massive influx
of revenue during the same period in which the Protestant Reformation was taking hold, and that revenue
would allow Spain to fight a seemingly endless series
of wars against both Catholic and Protestant foes.
Moreover, the Reformation itself was, at least to some
degree, technology-dependent: in a Europe without
large numbers of printing presses, and the resulting
encouragement both of middle-class literacy and the
free flow of ideas, the various religious strands that together comprised the Reformation might never have
gained momentum. After all, over the centuries there
had been numerous major heretical sects in Catholic
Europe (and untold hundreds of minor ones) that ultimately were quashed, even though some managed to
survive for decades or even centuries.
The Peace of Westphalia did not resolve many of
the social issues that encouraged political violence
in Europe—for instance, it was after Westphalia that
the religion-fueled English Civil War entered perhaps
its ugliest period, which included the execution of
Charles I and Parliament’s re-conquest of Ireland.16
Moreover, it certainly did not solve the “problem” of
interstate warfare—indeed, the Franco-Spanish War,
which started in 1635 as a component of the Thirty
Years’ War, continued until 1659. Nevertheless, the
Peace did reflect the fact that European politics and
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society had shifted decisively—it represented an implicit acknowledgement that Protestantism would
endure permanently—and that the Habsburg bid for
European hegemony had failed. Although it was not
obvious in 1648, Spain had begun a permanent political decline from which it would never recover, while
the eastern branch of the Habsburgs was compelled
to accept that the position of Holy Roman Emperor
would be much weakened, as power in the Empire
would be even more decentralized than had previously been the case.
A prerequisite to the Peace of Westphalia, in short,
was that certain conditions first had to improve; most
critically, the intellectual “fever” driving the wars of
religion on the Continent had to break, and Spanish
power had to become less disproportionate to that of
the other great powers. The rise of England, Sweden,
and the Dutch Republic, France’s brutal settling of its
internal religious discord, and Portugal’s decision in
1640 to sever itself from the Spanish crown—and the
resulting war between Lisbon and Madrid—all aided
in creating the latter. The meeting of these prerequisites, in turn, allowed the crafting of a Peace that
would further encourage strategic stability.
The example of the Europe of the 16th and early
17th centuries starkly illustrates how varied and complex the factors are that determine international stability and how costly and enduring highly unstable
conditions can be. Moreover, although the events in
question are rather distant chronologically, religious
discord and the use of new media to mobilize popular
passions are themes that have more than a little resonance today. One key difference between the 16th century and more recent times, however, would appear
to be the time which it takes for destabilizing factors to
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converge, creating the conditions for major volatility.
The stability of the 16th century multipolar European
system degraded at, by today’s standards, a leisurely
pace. In the last couple of centuries, however, history
has moved at a rapid clip—an understandable result
of the interrelated trends of sharply increasing economic prosperity, speedy social change (and resulting
instability), and the momentous increase in scientific
knowledge and application of that knowledge to create new technologies or improve existing ones.17 In
considering the meaning of strategic stability for this
century, it perhaps is useful also to consider an example drawn from an international system that already
had been altered profoundly by the Industrial Revolution and all that attended it.
ASSESSING STRATEGIC STABILITY: THE CASE
OF WORLD WAR I
Strategic stability is an appealing notion in large
part because it contains an underlying assumption
that intelligent and well-meaning policymakers can
determine when a relationship is becoming unstable
and then act to correct that instability. This can be hazardous, as it may obscure how dangerous the international environment actually may be—and the illusion
easily may incline policymakers to pursue a course of
action that is overly bold, or even outright reckless.
The outbreak of World War I provides an excellent
illustration of how difficult it is for contemporaries to
judge systemic instability. Given that nearly a century
has passed since mid-1914, we might reasonably claim
to have enough historical distance from the event to
enjoy at least some perspective on it. After all, we know
how the rest of the 20th century turned out, for both
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good and ill. Yet, we also have a staggering quantity
of government documents, memoirs, and other materials produced by the participants themselves, as well
as a huge secondary literature created by thousands
of scholars. This is a rare combination: the world is
far enough away from the war that it can be treated
as “distant” history, as opposed to “contemporary”
history, but the main combatants were recognizably
modern states which left massive paper trails that in
large part survived the conflict.
The most basic elements of the drama are wellknown.18 The two states anchoring the Central Powers at the time appeared to be in very different stages
of their “imperial life cycles.” Austria-Hungary was
a dignified but rather feeble multinational empire
suffering from intense centrifugal forces fed by nationalism; somewhat paradoxically, Vienna believed
that the solution to its problems might be found in
further expansion into the Balkans.19 The German Empire was youthful, vigorous, and dissatisfied with its
global status, militarily confident but nonetheless concerned that the rapid growth of Russia’s population
and economy soon would make it impossible to win a
two-front war against a Franco-Russian alliance.
The Triple Entente states also each faced unique
problems. France had an impressive colonial empire
and desired revenge for the Franco-Prussian War,
but its relatively stagnant population and economic
limitations created justifiable pessimism as to the
likelihood of victory against Germany. Britain’s empire truly was awesome, but its government worried
about Germany’s long-term intentions, particularly
its seafaring ambitions; however, London was unsure
as to whether to engage in a potentially costly continental war for which it was ill-prepared. The Russian
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Empire was poor, backward, and under continuing
threat of domestic insurrection; yet, it also was experiencing rapid economic growth, beginning to turn
its great mass of peasants into an educated industrial
work force, and undertaking a serious program of political reform. Moscow was ambitious in the Balkans
and elsewhere, but very much aware that the troubled
Russian state might be unable to bear the weight of a
long war.20
With retrospect, almost every scholar would agree
that in 1914 the European great power system did
not enjoy strategic stability, and that this made the
war possible. Yet, at what point did the great power
system become critically unstable? Had it been precariously unstable for a decade or more, but merely
lacked a catalyst that would touch off a war? Perhaps
the latter is the case, but there were events before 1914
that presumably could have served as “good enough”
catalysts for a European war—the First and Second Moroccan Crises of 1904 and 1911, for instance,
were treated quite seriously by contemporaries. The
European balance of military power did not change
significantly from 1911 to 1914, but in the first case diplomacy defused the crisis , while, in the second, war
was the outcome.
One of course could argue that tensions built up
over time, with goodwill and trust slowly disintegrating because of progressive crises. This is not an
unreasonable supposition, but it does not necessarily
bolster the notion that strategic stability is readily calculated—indeed, it perhaps undermines this notion.
In 1904 and 1911 crises were resolved through negotiation, but in 1914 the system was not stable enough
to prevent war. In the immediate aftermath of the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, most thoughtful ob-
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servers did not expect war. Quite the opposite, in fact:
they trusted that any crisis resulting from the murder
would end peaceably, in keeping with the pattern of
the recent past.
What, then, would have given the international
system the stability necessary to prevent war? Although Germany very much hoped that it would be
able to crush France in a matter of weeks, no major
power could be certain that it would be able to strike
a quick, fatal blow to its enemies—all the participants
knew that they were risking participation in a disastrous bloodletting. Of course, that is precisely what
then occurred; the two sides were balanced closely
enough that a long war, from which either side could
have emerged victorious, resulted. Indeed, in 1917
the Central Powers were dictating peace terms to the
former Russian Empire, and it appeared likely that
France and Italy soon would be in a similar position.
Given the attitudes and fears of great power policymakers of the day, it is plausible that crisis stability
would have been enhanced if there had been a greater
inequality in military power—although in mid-1914
no great power could be sure of victory, all of them
believed that, if they fought cunningly, meaningful victory could be attainable at a nonruinous price.
Yet, even if it is true that a starker imbalance between
the two sides would have prevented war, we cannot
know definitively how much deeper military inequality would need to have been to prevent war in 1914.
It is possible to develop all manner of counterfactual
scenarios in which war would not have occurred in
1914, but we cannot test them (e.g., perhaps the existence of an additional ten active German army divisions would have convinced Russia and France to
abandon Serbia to its fate—or, perhaps, it would have
made no political difference whatsoever).
100

These historical questions and problems underscore the disconcerting fact that strategic stability is
inherently flawed insofar as human events have a chaotic component: given that individuals interact with
each other in unpredictable, and sometimes surprising, ways, seemingly rock-solid strategic stability can
be illusory.21 Efforts to foster strategic stability may
fail not because of some miscalculation of the balance
of military forces or similar flaw, but simply because
actual human beings are not perfect rational actors—
pride, arrogance, fear, and other attitudes and emotions can lead to disaster.
The implications of this simple observation potentially are significant: if strategic stability can fail at
unpredictable times for unpredictable reasons, efforts
to assess stability not only are inherently unreliable
but sometimes may be dangerous, as a leader who assumes that a relationship with another state is stable
unwittingly may tempt fate. Indeed, if a potential opponent apparently much desires continued peace, an
actor has a particularly strong incentive to exploit that
agreeableness by acting aggressively, as war seems
unlikely. In this way, apparent stability can indirectly
encourage reckless behavior. However, the aggressive state may well miscalculate how tolerant its peer
will be of provocative behavior. For example, having
calculated that strategic stability will ensure that any
political crisis will not result in warfare with another
state, a leader may choose to play to domestic jingoism, saber-rattling and making intentionally hollow
threats. Most likely, the results will be what he or she
expects—a domestic political gain and the ultimately
peaceful resolution of the crisis. Sometimes, however,
the outcome will be a catastrophic 1914 result.
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The balance of military forces certainly is a component in the maintenance of peace, but it is only one
in an overall context that encompasses all the major
factors shaping the relationship between two security
communities—and, that relationship, in turn, influences and is influenced by the overall international
system. Moreover, one also must keep in mind the
“deep” factors that shape relationships between and
among states—such as physical geography and strategic history—and which themselves are inextricably
intertwined. Physical geography does not straightforwardly determine strategic history, but it does shape
the advantages and disadvantages that a security community enjoys, and remains meaningful throughout
that community’s existence, disciplining the options
available to it. In turn, the interaction of that community with other strategic actors will craft a strategic
history that is unique to it. That security community
will have a “folk memory” that, while not necessarily
accurate in its historical details, will shape its attitudes
and behavior toward its peers.
GETTING PAST THE COLD WAR: STRATEGIC
STABILITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY
Any useful discussion of future strategic stability must be grounded firmly in an understanding of
how the international system has changed in the past
2 decades. In the 20th century, the international system experienced two tectonic shifts.22 First, a multipolar great power system whose center of gravity was
in Western and Central Europe—one which already
had been gravely stressed by World War I—collapsed
altogether in the mid-1940s. In its place, a bipolar system took shape. However, by historical standards it
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did not last for long; in well less than half a century
bipolarity collapsed—happily, though surprisingly,
with relatively little violence. For the purposes herein,
the Post-Cold War period that followed lasted for approximately 1 decade, from December 26, 1991 (the
date of the USSR’s dissolution), to September 11, 2001
(9/11). This era was marked by U.S. unipolarity and
limited global hegemony.
Although it was common at the time for observers to refer to Washington as the global hegemon, this
rather overstated the power of the United States: the
rest of the world was not reduced to satellite status,
and Washington encountered frustrating limits to its
power. Among other things, it attempted and failed
to: mediate an end to Israeli-Palestinian hostilities;
convince Russia to remain on the path to development
of a healthy democratic system; and end warlordism in Somalia to create a stable government in that
country. Nevertheless, during this time the United
States was by far the greatest individual power, with
clear conventional superiority over any other military
power, the world’s largest economy in both absolute
or purchasing power parity terms (unless one treats
the European Union [EU] as a single unit), and the
diplomatic sway that one would expect such a mighty
polity to enjoy.
The 9/11 attacks did not bring an abrupt end to
U.S. quasi-hegemony. However, they did mark the beginning of a new emphasis in U.S. foreign policy. During the Post-Cold War years, U.S. grand strategy was
decidedly fuzzy. Washington put forward broad policy goals, such as furthering democratization and economic liberalization globally, but pursued them in an
unfocused manner—the result was a jumble of regional (e.g., North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]
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expansion) and country-specific (e.g., containment
of Iraq) strategies that did not form a coherent global
whole. The Bush administration’s declaration of a
Global War on Terrorism solved this problem, but created a potentially larger one: a near-obsessive focus on
the threat presented by Islamist terrorist movements
and a related impatience for the final resolution of the
“Saddam Hussein Question.”23
While the Obama administration dropped the use
of the phrase “Global War on Terrorism,” it did not
radically shift the grand strategic focus of the United
States: it de-emphasized Iraq, but shifted attention to
Afghanistan and Pakistan. More recently, the Arab
Spring created circumstances in which the United
States found itself attempting to cope with rapid political change in several North African and Southwest
Asian countries. The Arab Spring itself was a good
demonstration of the reality that apparent strategic
stability can be an illusion that dissipates in an eye
blink. Although the particular circumstances leading
to the Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya Wars were very
different, if one steps back they all form a somewhat
coherent but deeply flawed grand strategy: the United
States continues to focus its military power on certain
countries in the Muslim world and attempts to use
that power to stabilize them and, in turn, build a longterm partnership. In other Islamic countries, it does
not use kinetic military action, but attempts to accomplish similar goals through diplomacy and economic
incentives.24
The reason for this focus on specific Islamic countries is partly due to the simple pressure of events: the
wars in Afghanistan and Libya were “random” insofar as they resulted, respectively, from the Taliban’s
unwillingness to hand over individuals responsible
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for a surprise attack on U.S. soil and Muammar Qaddafi’s obstinate refusal to slip gently into prosperous
retirement—and the resulting Franco-British conviction that he therefore must be removed militarily by
NATO. For a cocktail of reasons, there has been a
good deal of “action”—both violent and nonviolent—
in Islamic countries in recent years, and the attention
of U.S. policymakers often follows television cameras.
However, U.S. policymakers also tend, by their behavior, to drive those television cameras to particular
places. If the American government were as inclined
to intervene in, say, the Democratic Republic of Congo, as it has been in certain other parts of the world,
Kinshasa’s hotels today would be overflowing with
journalists and camera crews.
This does not imply that there is a clear, multistage U.S. strategy to change the Islamic world into
something new—indeed, the opposite is more nearly
the case: American actions often have been ad hoc;
insofar as there has been a panoramic vision (as in
the Bush administration’s quasi-plan for counterterrorism through the spread of democracy), it has been
unrealistic. There is, however, a clear pattern to U.S.
behavior, with counterterrorism and a related concern
for the political health of Islamic countries having become the central focus of U.S. grand strategy. By all
appearances, Washington’s attitude essentially is that
strategic stability in the Islamic world is the most fundamental challenge to global strategic stability.
This is, however, not necessarily an accurate perception. It is becoming increasingly clear that unipolarity is, at best, very deeply corroded—and, given the
spectacular rise of China, it would not be unreasonable to declare it dead. China’s rise, however, has not
resulted in the recreation of bipolarity, but, rather, is
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part of the re-emergence of multipolarity: Russia, troubled though it is, remains a great power; Japan has the
economic resources necessary for great power status,
even if it remains reticent politically; India is rapidly
emerging both economically and politically; and Brazil clearly is bidding for acknowledgement as a toptier power, though it thus far has failed to demonstrate
global influence commensurate with such a status. At
this point, we cannot confidently predict precisely
what states will be on the list of great powers 2 decades from now—for instance, by then the EU might
have welded itself into a great power, acrimoniously
collapsed, or remained somewhere between these two
extremes. It is clear, however, that a multipolar global
system is taking shape. Moreover, because we are in
a period of, historically speaking, quite rapid transformation in the global system, strategic instability is
endemic.
In addition, just as in the 16th century, technological, economic, and social factors are conspiring to encourage instability in the international system. Even
absent war, the fortunes of individual states can rise
or fall with surprising speed; the best illustration of
this is the contrast between the impoverished China
of the Cultural Revolution—an ideologically bizarre
near-failed state in which a scientist was more likely
to be sent to the countryside to do stoop labor than to
receive a research grant—and today’s near-superpower. There is no sign that this is slowing down; indeed,
we should expect further acceleration in the pace of
socio-political change.
It is notable that, just as in the 16th century, social
and religious change menaces stability both within and
among countries. Religious awakenings are occurring
not only in the Muslim world, but also in Christian
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countries in Africa—and, in an obvious formula for
trouble, in mixed Christian-Muslim states such as Nigeria.25 China may also be in the early stages of a mass
religious awakening, with unpredictable effects. India
remains religiously tense, and not only because of the
always strained Hindu-Muslim relationship; rapid
economic and social change appears to be intensifying
the political struggle between those who would define India as a nonsectarian democracy (the traditional
preference of the Indian political elite) and those who
wish India to have a more assertively Hindu identity.
At the same time, in many countries there are nonreligiously-driven calls for political change—or, as in
Libya, cases in which democratic secularists, sincere
proponents of both electoral democracy and greater
religiosity in government, and would-be totalitarian theocrats find themselves temporarily thrown together, with an unpredictable ultimate outcome. One
might hope that in the 21st century religious sentiment
will not cause as much violence as it did in the 16th
and 17th centuries, but the record of the last decade
does not inspire confidence.
This “perfect storm of instability” has serious implications for the security of the United States, though
it should not be the cause of undue panic. Washington
remains, by a long stretch, the greatest military power,
and its economy is the world’s largest, unless the EU
is counted as a single whole (a practice with obvious
shortcomings, given the ongoing European debt crisis). The gap between the power of the United States
and its nearest peer, China, remains enormous—and,
if it is prudent, the United States can take advantage of
this fact to act as a force for global peace. Washington
cannot artificially create strategic stability—the global
strategic environment is inherently unstable. It can,
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however, exert much influence over how the multipolar system develops in coming years.
Unfortunately, this is no simple matter of being
hawkish or dovish, but requires a sophisticated grand
strategy that is constantly being re-evaluated and rebalanced to account for changing circumstances. In
such a grand strategy, U.S. goals would include: maintaining its position as the greatest individual power;
seeking to discourage the creation of great power
alliances that would threaten U.S. interests (such as
a Sino-Russian axis); preventing great power war, if
possible; preparing to win a great power war militarily and craft a postwar global security environment
friendly to U.S. interests, should it prove impossible
to prevent a conflict; and attempting to craft institutions, whether formal or informal, that will serve to
diffuse enmity between great powers and allow the
powers to work together to cope with global strategic
instability.26
This is a very tall order, but it is the most sensible
blueprint for the reorientation of U.S. grand strategy.
The continuing U.S. focus on the Islamic world is myopic. Certainly, events in some Islamic countries are
very important, but—especially as the large-scale production of fossil fuels is becoming far more evenly distributed globally, with new technologies promising a
massive increase in output in many countries, including Brazil, Canada, and the United States27—there is
little reason to believe that they offer some sort of key
that will solve the puzzle of global strategic stability.
Washington would benefit from a broader perspective
that considers the international system as a whole and
focuses particular attention on competition and cooperation among the great powers.
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CONCLUSION: STRATEGIC STABILITY IN A
CHANGING WORLD
Cold War-era conceptions of strategic stability
have little salience in the 21st century security environment. At this point, a focus on nuclear arsenals—
particularly on just the Russian and American nuclear
arsenals—is archaic. There is good reason to question,
for instance, whether MAD can carry the weight of ensuring that there is no naval clash between China and
the United States over the issue of Taiwanese independence. Even the consideration of military power more
broadly is only partially illuminating. We now are in
a multipolar environment in which many factors, including alliance relationships among the various great
and medium powers, will impact the character of the
security environment.
As discussed above, the entire global system is a
period of epochal change; this transformation cannot be prevented or controlled, only guided to a limited degree. With that in mind, the following general
points concerning strategic stability are offered:
1. Social, economic, technogical, religious/ideological, and other broad trends impact global strategic stability deeply. Military power is only part of the
enormously complex strategic stability equation.
2. Strategic stability is fluid to the degree that the
term itself is problematic. Events do not invariably
follow a clear timeline in which one event builds on
another to create a stable environment. International
circumstances can change quickly—for example, the
French Revolution radically altered a seemingly stable
(if competitive) European security environment. Similarly, the “Velvet Revolutions” in East-Central Europe
and the collapse of the Soviet Union demolished a bi-
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polar system that appeared stable to the point of being
nearly inert.
3. Problematic though the term might be, strategic stability does express an important truth: at some
points the international system is far more prone to
extreme political violence than it is at other times.
4. Strategic stability and strategic instability are
not absolute conditions, especially in a vibrant multipolar system. It is more helpful to think of a “stability
continuum” that, in practice, ranges from extremely
stable to extremely unstable. However, precisely where
the global system is on that continuum at a given time cannot be measured reliably—at best, one can make an educated guess.
5. Leaders who are excessively confident in the
stability of the international system are apt to make
decisions that increase the likelihood of war.
6. As the second example cited in #2 above illustrates, strategic stability is not inherently good—
sometimes instability can allow for positive change.
However, generally speaking, great power warfare is
more likely when the security environment is highly
unstable.
7. Strategic stability cannot reliably be increased
through arms control or similar measures. It is true
that arms control agreements may assuage the fears of
particular states and thus might have a positive impact
on the overall security environment. However, the
historical evidence would seem to indicate that this is
a minor effect that is easily overwhelmed by negative
events: the golden age for arms control was the 1920s,
but the Great Depression created conditions ripe for
hyper-nationalist militarism and eventual war.
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The United States would do well to engage in a sophisticated discussion of strategic stability that places
the term solidly in the political context of this century.
Two decades now have passed since the collapse of
the Soviet Union, and it is well past the point where it
is possible to have any confidence that the prevention
of warfare is a matter of balancing nuclear arsenals.
Rather, Washington must be intellectually prepared to
grapple with the enormously more complicated task
of working to guide a rapidly emerging multipolar
international system that will be confronted by the
crushing pressures of technological, social, and economic change.
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